In every discussion of Military Theory and its historical development, gallons of ink are spilled on reams of paper over names like Sun Tzu, Marshal de Saxe, Antoine Henri Jomini, Carl von Clausewitz, John Boyd, and many others that echo among the halls of the current military establishment and academia. One name not mentioned quite as often as the others is that of the late Roman writer Flavius Vegetius Renatus. While his seminal work, the De Re Militari (also known as the Epitoma Rei Militaris), is often included and studied alongside other great works of military thinkers, it is rarely ever recognized for having much of a substantial impact at all on the development of military doctrine in the West. Part of this is due to the fact that the era in which the DRM had its most profound effect – the Medieval era – arose centuries after the collapse of the Empire for whose rescue Vegetius had written it in the first place. A large percentage of military historians have often treated the Medieval period with vague disinterest or even mild disgust – seeing it and the warfare that took place in it as unsophisticated, uninteresting, and riddled with quixotic pageantry that seems baffling to modern observers. Because of this prevailing attitude, Medieval military historians are an extremely niche minority. Those who seek to investigate which military theory informed Medieval warfare and what contributions it passed on to the future are even more so. And yet, it is an inquiry that not only deserves to be explored, but holds immense significance for the study of Western military thought and practice as a whole. This brings us directly to the figure of Vegetius. First, this piece will examine the history and circumstances of both the DRM itself and the man who composed it. Next, it will trace the extensive influence that Vegetian military thought left upon writers, thinkers, statesmen, and soldiers from all over Medieval Europe. Lastly, it will examine those actual military developments put into practice during the Medieval period that issued, either deliberately or otherwise, from the principles of Vegetius and the DRM. This essay will prove that the theory of war contained in the DRM of Flavius Vegetius Renatus served as the primary source for Medieval military theory and the inspiration for many of the strategic developments of a crucially dynamic era in European military history.
Before delving into the Medieval reception of the DRM, it is first necessary to investigate the text itself, the history and sources behind it, and the man who wrote it. It is widely believed that Flavius Vegetius Renatus lived and wrote sometime between 383 and 450AD. The honorary appellation of Flavius in his name signifies that he was a member of the privileged patrician class, relegated at that time of the Empire to the typical occupation of Imperial court official. He never served in the army himself, instead, he collected his military knowledge from both his experiences as a professional bureaucrat and, more importantly, from a wide variety of Roman military writers from the Empire’s past. Vegetius did not write the DRM for his own musings – he directly addressed his work for the edification of a current ruling emperor. Most translations have him name a Valentinian – most likely Valentinian III. However, there are some historians who believe these translations to be incorrect and argue that he wrote his seminal work for the more renowned – and more militarily impressive – Theodosius I. So far, no firm resolution has been reached on this topic.
Vegetius lived at a time when the Western Roman Empire – the power that had dominated over the entire world encompassing the Mediterranean Sea for nearly five centuries– was in the final stages of its terminal decline. After two centuries of incessant civil conflict between would-be emperors (some of whom only ruled for mere months before meeting violent ends at the hands of rivals), the famed legions that had guarded the limes of the empire no longer possessed even a fraction of their former unity and cohesion. Additionally, vast movements of migratory Germanic tribes into the Empire had weakened the integrity of the Imperial frontiers and irreversibly transformed the ethnic population within, forcing later emperors to hire these barbarian foederati troops to man the legions, degrading their quality and loyalty even further. Vegetius himself mourned the “negligence and sloth” that had come to characterize the “Roman” legions that were hardly Roman at all by that time. As he began to turn his mind to matters of war and the state, the known world of his day was indeed slipping into a truly dark age – an era defined by the failure of a socio-political order that had ruled supreme for the better half of a millennium. The DRM served as a desperate response to the inevitable decline its author hoped he could remedy.
At the heart of Vegetius’ work was his emphasis on the military methods and traditions from
storied martial past. In the prologue to
Book 1, Vegetius admits that his ideas are in no way his, but rather a
compilation of those who had come before.
“One advantage, however, I derive from the nature of this work, as it
requires no elegance of expression or extraordinary share of genius, but only
great care and fidelity in collecting and explaining, for public use, the
instructions and observations of our old historians of military affairs, or
those who wrote expressly concerning them.” For Vegetius, the military methods of the
past held the keys to martial success that might save the Empire from its
impending doom. “Compiled under a
particular set of circumstances,” C. T. Allmand writes, “the DRM represented what were, in its
author’s view, ‘systematized remedies,’ the search for which made him look back
unashamedly to the days when the Roman army had carried all before it.” Many of his muses are mentioned explicitly by
the author – Cato the Elder, Cornelius Celsus, Sallust, Virgil, and the
ordinances of Augustus, Trajan, and Hadrian. Another major source is Julius Sextus
Frontinus – the Roman provincial governor of Britannia in the late 1st
Century AD and a seasoned general who also wrote a treatise on military
science, the Strategemata, which
sadly no longer exists in its entirety. While Vegetius may not have had much military
experience of his own, he sought to compile and present the collective military
wisdom of the past five centuries in one work to rescue his Empire from
destruction. It is this compilation
that, as historical fate would have it, became a unique school of military
thought on its own with far unforeseen consequences for the future of European
military and social development. Rome
Three themes are ever present in Vegetian military theory – the supremacy of discipline cultivated through regular and rigorous training, the superiority of infantry armies composed of citizen recruits, and the vital importance of a unified chain of command at every organizational level. For Vegetius, trained discipline was the ultimate key to the military success of any army and especially of the Legions of old. Almost the entirety of Book I deals directly with this topic – a topic Vegetius warned that, if neglected, would bode ill for any state, no matter how secure they think they are. The first step to cultivating this discipline was to select the proper recruits. Vegetius believed that not everyone possessed the proper physical and moral qualities necessary to stand firm on the battlefield – he personally recommended drawing levies from the “country professions,” i.e. young men already accustomed to hard living and harder labor. Any others were too accustomed to the pleasures of peace and were unfit in his opinion. Training should be frequent, methodical, and intense – soldiers needed to know the physical and mental demands of every action he may face on and off the battlefield. He began Book II by stressing how critically important it was for these levies to come from the citizenry of the state itself, not from foreign mercenaries whose only motive was pay. Vegetius saw the occupation of the soldier as one of a sacred trust between him, God (the Roman Empire of his day had long since embraced Christianity), and the Emperor for the sake of the common defense – hence why he advocated that every soldier initiate his service by swearing an oath of allegiance to the Emperor and the state in the name of the Holy Trinity. The authority of the state should permeate every level of the army’s hierarchy of officers, ensuring total unity of command and maintenance of that vital discipline from the lowest ranks to the highest. The army must possess the capability to supply all its needs and wants in any environment, like a “well-fortified city as containing within itself everything requisite in war, when it moved.” Finally, war was the primary concern of the state, summarizing his theory on the relationship between the two in his most famous maxim found in Book III – “He, therefore, who desires peace, should prepare for war.”
However, the DRM was not consigned to the fate of mere relic of a fallen empire, but found a new life of sorts among the “barbarians” in the West, eager for the same secrets to military dominance that Rome once enjoyed. Western interest in this knowledge contained within the surviving literature of Antiquity began early, granting them new leases on life in the monastic libraries that flourished as the West steadily arose from chaos of the “Dark Ages” and into the social and cultural renewal of the Carolingian period. Both Alcuin, Charlemagne’s trusted scholar and confidant, and the “Venerable” Bede of England referenced Vegetius and the DRM in their writings on spiritual warfare. It didn’t take long for those with more military purposes to rediscover Vegetian thought either – Anglo-Saxon records from the fifth and sixth centuries borrow heavily from terms and concepts featured in the DRM. Medieval warfare, especially in the early phases, was defined by what John France labeled “proprietorial warfare” – a style of war dominated by the strategic concerns of a particular social class, i.e. the knightly mounted noble, and over which a centralized political authority had little to no real control. War in this period was a rather loose affair – the decentralized nature of political power and the intense economic dependence on agricultural production made it nearly impossible to effectively raise and command large standing forces for any significant length of time. Armies typically consisted of a small cadre of professional knightly cavalry bound by complex feudal obligations and beholden to a strict, almost ritualistic code of chivalrous conduct around whom congregated motley crews of infantry consisting of both mercenary specialists and peasant levies – neither of whom were terribly reliable. In what few battles did occur, the massed charges of the heavy knightly cavalry often carried the day, as dramatically seen at Hastings (1066), Antioch (1098), Brémule (1119), Montgisard (1177), Arsuf (1191), and Bouvines (1214). However, as the 12th Century dawned over a
defined by far greater social, political, and economic stability, many
thinkers, statesmen, and commanders began to see the flaws inherent in a
military system so dependent on such unreliable actors and the whims of
decentralized “proprietorial” social concerns. For some, the writings of Vegetius provided
not only solutions, but a blueprint for a whole new system of military thought.
To grasp the full spectrum of the Medieval reception of Vegetian military thought, it is necessary to examine the writings of the various authors of military thinkers and leaders who drew their primary inspiration from the DRM. One of the earliest of those who sought to apply Vegetian military principles to his current day was the English cleric and statesman, John of Salisbury. Born in either 1115 or 1120, John of Salisbury received an impeccably classical education at the burgeoning university schools in
, where his curriculum included vast
amounts of literature from the Classical era. In an era when the line dividing the secular
from the religious in society was far less defined than it is today, John
presided over a long career as a cleric that heavily involved him in the public
affairs of his day, rubbing shoulders with renowned figures like King Henry II
Plantagenet of England and his turbulent chancellor, Archbishop St. Thomas a’
Becket. His career also granted him a front row seat
to the turbulent social and political theatre of 12th Century Europe,
witnessing firsthand the horrific succession crisis in Paris known
as “the Anarchy” and the subsequent meteoric rise of the Plantagenet dynasty
and their Angevin Empire. This left John
with an insatiable interest in political theory and the proper ordering of the
ideal society, or res publica, as he
called it, which he compiled into his seminal work, the Policraticus. Using many
sources from both Sacred and Classical texts, he featured the DRM prominently in Book VI regarding
military affairs and the state, quoting it directly in multiple places. John’s overall argument was that the army
should fulfill the role of the “armed hand” (armata manus) of society, meant to protect the peace and order of
the state from the depredations of external foes. In order to properly fulfill this role, the
state needed men willing to serve to this end with unwavering loyalty in a
skillful and violent capacity. John
repeats the Vegetian proscriptions for the proper recruitment and training of
troops, the supremacy of discipline, and the supreme importance of the role of
the Prince in commanding the loyalty of this institution.While
it is difficult to discern John’s ultimate purpose in the Policraticus, he was certainly encouraging rulers of his time to
take the step in the direction of exercising unified command over the means of
waging war for the state at the expense of the decentralized and often
rebellious aristocracy. “In his view,” writes Allmand, “the army was
to be seen as the institution which, working with the king, would bolster the
power and increasingly centralized authority of the royal office.” John of Salisbury started Vegetian military
thought on a journey throughout the great minds of the Medieval period that
would have significant ramifications for England Europe
as a whole.
Following shortly after John of Salisbury, the next social luminary to draw directly from the DRM as a valid basis for military thought was Giles of Rome. Much like John of Salisbury, Giles of Rome participated actively in public service while also wearing the habit of the Augustinian Order and served as the personal tutor for the young man who would become King Philip IV “the Fair” of France. As a young man, he studied under the intellectual prowess of St. Thomas Aquinas (who was also well acquainted with the DRM and Vegetian military thought) and his Dominican school of Scholastic philosophy, heavily steeped in Aristotelian ideals that were taking the 13th Century West by storm. On his own in the 1270s, Giles composed a treatise, the De Regimine Principum, on the state and political leadership for his pupil and incorporated in it a great deal of political ideals that demonstrated the rapidly developing attitudes towards the state and its purpose in Medieval society. Twenty-three chapters in his work deal with war and the state’s responsibilities regarding it, all infused with Vegetian thought. Many of the principles Giles touched on were the same as John of Salisbury a century earlier – the need for disciplined, hardy, professionally-trained soldiers who fought at the command of a unified sovereign for the peace and security of the well-ordered state. However, Giles wrote with more of a contemporary focus than his past counterparts – he sought to take that military wisdom from the DRM that possessed relevancy to the warfare of his own time and transmit it to his reader as a practical methodology for establishing such an army. And Giles was justified in his efforts – at the time he wrote the De Regimine Principum in the late 13th Century, many realms in Christendom were just beginning to discover (and experiment with) the power of unified royal armies and professional commoner infantry. The Vegetian military thought repurposed by Giles of Rome acquired a far wider audience than they ever would have acquired on their own as his work became one of the most widely read political treatises of its day, gaining attention from noble and commoner alike.
Giles’ unique transmission of the DRM had a substantially wider impact on Medieval Europe than those who had come before and served as the starting point for a whole host of others who sought to chime in on military affairs. One of the most notable was the fascinating character of Christine de Pizan. Defying the misconception that Medieval women contributed little to the development of social and political thought, Christine wrote extensively on political theory after leaving her native Italy with her astrologer father as he served in the court of King Charles V of France (1364-1380). During Charles’ reign, Christine witnessed France’s rescue from the complete disaster of the first phase of the Hundred Years War and the humiliating Treaty of Brétigny forced upon the realm by King Edward III of England after his son’s crushing victory over Charles’ father, Jean II, at Poitiers in 1356. In two major works written in the first decade of the 15th Century, a study of Charles V’s reign commissioned after his death and a general treatise on war and military law, Christine drew heavily from Vegetian thought as transmitted through Giles of Rome when discussing the military affairs of her day and what lessons they could teach. She was especially interested in the lesson offered by Bertrand du Guesclin – the Breton knight of humble origins who rose to fame when King Charles’ appointed him Marshal of France and whose Fabian tactics against the hated English earned him the everlasting gratitude of his country. “Vegetius, she argued, made no distinction between social groups, so his ideas should be applied to all who shared the obligations of defense.” This emphasis on “promotion by merit” became a very popular idea associated with Vegetian military thought in the 14th and 15th Centuries in direct defiance to the proprietorial warfare of older days. As evidenced through the writings of Christine (although she was by far not the only one), the ancient military principles of the DRM, revived and repackaged by Medieval scholars, began to take shape as a consistent and readily applicable military theory that emphasized “the influence … which human activity had upon success or failure; the need for order and discipline … the necessity of promoting only the very best to positions of responsibility in the army; and the eternal need for vigilance and forethought in a battle of minds as well as bodies.”
Finally, the legacy of Vegetius and the DRM not only persevered up to the conclusion of the Medieval era in the late 15th Century, but actually witnessed a groundswell resurgence of interest in its principles among Renaissance thinkers, at the forefront of whom stood the iconic Niccolò Machiavelli. While the man’s political theory is as well-known as his name, Machiavelli also extensively touched on the topic of war and its relationship within the republican-type state he so admired. Machiavelli very much belonged to the humanist school of Renaissance thinkers and possessed an intense, if not fanatical devotion for the literature and ideas of Antiquity, which he incorporated heavily in his thoughts on the state and society. In his Art of War, Machiavelli’s use of Vegetian military principles is heavy, as in his insistence on recruiting levies for his citizen army from the country and “hard” trades, the need for intense and repetitive training, and the supreme importance of soldiers solely motivated to fight for the good of their state – not for pay or vain glory. However, Machiavelli never names or credits his source – possibly showing how universal such principles had become by that time. In The Prince, Machiavelli more closely merged together his political philosophy with his decidedly Vegetian-inspired military thought. National armies, drawn from the native citizenry and drilled into tightly disciplined infantry, were the answer to the problems in late 15th century Italy caused by the condottieri mercenaries and the inherent unreliability of those professional “sell-swords.”. In his ideal society, war should be the primary concern of a Prince – as its very existence depended on the soldiers that fought for it and his leadership of those troops. “For both men, the soldier was the foundation of the state: for Vegetius, as the defender of the people’s liberties, property, and wealth; for Machiavelli, through the role played by the army in establishing and maintaining proper government.”
Military theories are only so good as the successes – or failures – that they bring to their adherents on the battlefield and no discussion about the Medieval legacy of the DRM can be complete without a look into those strategic developments this transmitted legacy inspired. One of the most iconic and impactful examples of this resurgence in Vegetian-style citizen-army organization was the Assize-of-Arms system of Medieval England. The founder of the system, the dynamic King Henry II Plantagenet, possessed several deep connections to Vegetian military thought – his family as far back as Fulk III of Anjou (987-1040) owned a copy of the DRM and studied it diligently. Possibly motivated by the thoughts of John of Salisbury (who was highly active in his court), King Henry sought to establish a more standardized method of recruitment than the mere feudal levies common in his day. The Assize of Arms of 1180 mandated that all freemen (regardless of social status) should be ready to bear arms specified to their income level in the event the King called for them. This Assize started a revolutionary series of military policies that would set Medieval England far apart from her more feudal Continental neighbors. The civic character of the Assize was reinforced even more by another Plantagenet warrior king, Edward I, and his Statute of Winchester in 1285 – which clarified exactly what weaponry and armor each income level were required to maintain and (for the first time) established rates of payment for each rank. By the reign of his bellicose grandson, Edward III (himself an avid reader of the DRM), the armies of England possessed a decidedly national and professional character, with archers raised from local shires where they regularly trained with their weapons by Royal decree and serving in France and beyond under indentures that paid them the modestly handsome salary of 3-6d a day. “The (English) organization of war,” wrote longbow scholar Sir Robert Hardy, “had moved into the modern context.” This English military system and the armies full of professionally-trained yeomen archers and men-at-arms that it mustered burst onto the Continental scene during the reign of Edward III and the war he began later known to history as the Hundred Years War. There, the “proto-national” armies of professional English commoners proved their mettle repeatedly against the feudal forces of aristocratic mounted knights and hired mercenaries used by France and nearly every chronicler of that long and bloody conflict attested to their lethal effectiveness at the great victories of Crecy, Poitiers, and Agincourt (among many others).
At about the time England waged war with France on the Continent, a wider military movement slowly gained momentum around the early 14th Century in reaction to the perceived strategic and tactical weaknesses of proprietorial warfare dominated by an aristocratic mounted elite. Some military historians call this the “Infantry Revolution.” While debate abounds around the term, the fact that a gradual movement away from the knightly cavalry dominated warfare and towards that waged by professionally trained commoners (in strong keeping with the admonitions of Vegetius nearly a millennium earlier) is unavoidable. As early as 1302, disciplined Flemish urban militias, armed with pike and goededag, mauled the French chivalry at Courtrai – as they would do many times again throughout the 14th Century. Similar developments arose in fiercely independent Switzerland (whose masterfully drilled citizen-soldiers won Machiavelli’s praise) and in the military Ordinances of Duke Charles “the Bold” of Burgundy, one of the first Medieval heads of state to openly credit Vegetian principles as the primary basis for his actual military policies. Even the French, finally goaded out of their stubbornly-held feudal mindset, finally concluded the Hundred Years War with England in their favor by adopting their own unique take on the “Infantry Revolution” – simultaneously professionalizing their armies in the same spirit as England and successfully integrating a new weapon that finally overcame the dreaded longbow – the gunpowder artillery piece.
While one can never claim definitively (nor should they) that the DRM directly inspired the English military system and the other various installments of the Infantry Revolution in Medieval Europe, to say that it had no connection requires a willfully belligerent ignorance. Defying the collapse of the Empire it was meant to save, the military thought within the DRM found new pupils eager to learn from its more universal military principles. It was not the exact circumstances of the old Roman legions that had made them so formidable on the battlefield, rather, it was the deeper and more socially integrated concepts of organization, discipline, and unity of command. As one traces the reception of Vegetian military thought through the Medieval period, it is those concepts that carry the most traction and leave behind the greatest impact – and were ultimately vindicated by the actual historical outcome. Many modern military historians criticize Vegetius and the DRM for being “unoriginal” and disappointingly retrospective. However, these historians are failing to take into account the Medieval experience of Vegetius and his vast influence on the development of war and society in the West, “since so much of what he expressed belongs to almost any kind of war, fought at almost any time, almost anywhere.” By investigating the unique transmission of Vegetian military principles through the various thinkers, statesmen, and soldiers of the Medieval era, the vast impact of Vegetius and his De Re Militari on both the military theory and history of Europe is unavoidably clear.
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 Henceforth, the De Re Militari will be signified by the acronym DRM.
 Kelly Devries, Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century (Suffolk UK: Boydell Press, 1996), 4-5.
 Christopher Allmand, The De Re Militari of Vegetius – The Reception, Transmission, and Legacy of a Roman Text in the Middle Ages (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 1.
 Ibid., 2 & John R. E. Bliese, “Rhetoric Goes to War: The Doctrine of Ancient and Medieval Military Manuals,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 24, no. 3-4 (Summer-Autumn 1994), 110.
 Flavius Vegetius Renatus, De Re Militari, trans. Lt John Clarke (St. Petersburg FL: Red and Black Publishers, 2008), 5.
 Allmand, De Re Militari, 1.
 Pat Southern & Karen R. Dixon, The Late Roman Army (New York: Routledge, 2014), x-xii.
 Stephen Morillo, War in World History, Vol. 1 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2009), 72-73.
 Vegetius, DRM, 20.
 Ibid., 5-6.
 Allmand, 2.
 Charles R. Shrader , “The Influence of Vegetius‘ De Re Militari,“ Military Affairs 45, no. 4 (Dec. 1981), 168.
 Vegetius, 34 & Bliese, “Rhetoric,“ 106.
 Vegetius, 7-8.
 Ibid., 16.
 Vegetius, 9.
 Ibid., 11 & 26.
 Ibid., 27 & 32-33.
 Ibid., 35.
 Ibid., 36-40 & 58.
 Ibid., 44.
 Ibid., 52.
 Allmand, 64-65.
 Margaret Deanesly, ”Roman Traditionalist Influence among the Anglo-Saxons,” The English Historical Review 58, no. 230 (Apr 1943), 130 & 140.
 John France, Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades 1000-1300 (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 2-3.
 Ibid., 1 & 3.
 Ibid., 12 & Vegetius, 90.
 France, Age of the Crusades, 8.
 Cary Nederman, “Introduction” in John of Salisbury, Policraticus, ed. & trans. Cary Nederman (Cambridge UK, Cambridge University Press, 1990), xvi.
 Ibid., xvii.
 John of Salisbury, Policraticus, ed. & trans Cary Nederman (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 110, 115, & 124.
 Ibid., 104-105.
 Ibid., 109-112 & 114-118.
 Allmand, 89.
 Ibid., 91.
 Charles Briggs, Giles of Rome’s De Regimine Principum (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 9.
 Gregory Reichberg, ”Thomas Aquinas on Military Prudence,” Journal of Military Ethics 9, no. 3 (2010), 265.
 Briggs, Giles of Rome, 9.
 Allmand, 105.
 Briggs, 10.
 Allmand, 110.
 David Nicolle, European Medieval Tactics, Vol 2 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2012), 10-11.
 Allmand, 111.
 Allmand, 121.
 Ibid., 123.
 The Livre des fais et bonnes meurs du sage roy Charles V and Livres des fais d’armes et de chevalerie, respectively.
 Allmand, 122 & 124.
 Ibid., 126.
 Allmand, 127.
 Timothy Lukes, ”Martialing Machiavelli: Reassessing the Military Reflections,” The Journal of Politics 66, no. 4 (Nov 2004), 1090-1091.
 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Art of War (Seattle WA: Pacific Publishing Studio, 2010), 7-8, 12, & 16.
 Allmand, 145.
 Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. N. H. Thompson (New York: Dover Publications, 1992), 36-37.
 Ibid., 37.
 Allmand, 146.
 Shrader, “Influence,” 169.
 Allmand, 90.
 Richard Wadge, Arrowstorm (Gloucestershire UK: The History Press, 2007), 26.
 Ibid., 27-28 & 103.
 Robert Hardy, Longbow – A Social and Military History, 5th ed. (Somerset UK: Haynes Publishing, 2012), 122.
 Jean Froissart, Chronicles, trans. Geoffrey Brereton (London, Penguin Group, 1978), 88-89 & 135 and Jean le Bel, The True Chronicles of Jean le Bel 1290-1360, trans. Nigel Bryant (Suffolk UK: Boydell Press, 2011), 180 and Clifford J. Rogers, “The Efficacy of the English Longbow: A Reply to Kelly DeVries,” War in History 5, no. 2 (1998), 235 & 239-242.
 John Stone, “Technology, Society, and the Infantry Revolution of the Fourteenth Century,” Journal of Military History 68 (Apr 2004), 376.
 DeVries, Infantry Warfare, 9.
 Machiavelli, Art, 128 and Allmand, 136-137.
 Allmand, 301 & Clifford J. Rogers, “The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years War” in The Military Revolutions Debate, ed. Clifford Rogers (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1995), 74-75.
 Allmand, 333.
 Ibid., 334.